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Abstract
The psychological validity of inheritance reasoners is clarified.
Elio and Pelletier (1993) presented the first pilot experiment
exploring some of these issues. We investigate other foun-
dational assumptions of inheritance reasoning with defaults:
transitivity, blocking of transitivity by negative defaults, pre-
emption in terms of structurally defined specificity and struc-
turally defined redundancy of information. Responses were
in accord with the assumption of at least limited transitivity,
however, reasoning with negative information and structurally
defined specificity conditions did not support the predictions
of the literature. ‘Preemptive’ links were found to provide
additional information leading to indeterminacy, rather than
providing completely overriding information as the literature
predicts. On the other hand, results support the structural iden-
tification of certain links as redundant. Other findings suggest
that inheritance proof-theory might be excessively guided by
its syntax.
Introduction
Inheritance reasoning is a variety of propositional default lo-
gic with graphical syntax. Inheritance reasoners purport to
provide a psychologically plausible model of reasoning with
defaults  and have been invoked in the semantic analysis of
natural language generics. However, there is considerable
debate in the AI literature about the “correct” definition of in-
heritance reasoning (Touretzky, Horty, & Thomason, 1987).
Most of this discussion is based on logicians’ introspective
analyses of what conclusions can be drawn from any particu-
lar network of propositional default statements. Conflicting
intuitions, perhaps prejudiced by interest in proof-theoretic
features like computational complexity (cf. Selman & Leves-
que, 1989; Horty, Thomason, & Touretzky, 1990), are in part
responsible for the lack of an accepted unifying semantics for
inheritance reasoning (cf. Boutilier, 1989). Given the absence
of a parameterized model theory, it is surprising that until very
recently there have been no psychological investigations desi-
gned to elucidate the semantics of generics with respect to the
idealizations of inheritance theory. Elio and Pelletier (1993)
present results about the way people classify exceptional ob-
jects in light of default theories in relation to the way general
default logics (alternative nonmonotonic systems) classify the
same exceptional objects. They also present the first pilot
study applying similar scrutiny to inheritance reasoners, but
they do not consider other foundational claims of inheritance
 Partially motivated by the idea that tangled hierarchies are ubi-
quitous in the organization of information.
reasoning. This paper presents an experiment designed to
ascertain whether assumptions of inheritance reasoning ab-
out transitivity, negative reasoning, structural preemption and
structural redundancy are predictive of human reasoning with
generics. This same experiment was also designed to test the
degree of fit of extant theories of inheritance reasoning, but
those results are reported elsewhere (Hewson & Vogel, 1994).
Inheritance Reasoning
Default inheritance reasoning is a nonmonotonic system for
reasoning about generics like, “Birds fly.” In these systems,
generics are encoded as links in directed acyclic graphs, the
nodes of which represent individuals, properties, or classes,
and the links of which represent statements of positive or
negative defaults. So, for example, Fig. 1 depicts a default
inheritance network. Let the nodes of the graph labeled A, B
andC represent penguins, birds and fliers, respectively. Thus,
the network represents that birds fly, that penguins are birds,
and that penguins do not fly.
A B C
Figure 1: A Simple Inheritance Network
Inheritance reasoners define methods for reaching conclu-
sions implicit in graph representations of sentences. Implicit
conclusions correspond to paths through the graph that are
distinguished as permitted. As an example, an easily stated
theory of inheritance is shortest path reasoning, in which the
conclusion of a graph that is not simply linear is taken to
be the conclusion that corresponds to the shortest linear path
through the entire graph. Touretzky (1986) has shown this
form of reasoning to be formally undesirable; however, most
inheritance reasoners agree with shortest path reasoning in
simple cases, and determine, for instance, that the potential
path in Fig. 1 from A to C through the intervening node B
is not permitted because it is preempted by the more speci-
fic information represented by the direct negative link from
A to C. However, when it comes to more complex graph
topologies, different inheritance reasoners diverge considera-
bly on which paths should be permitted from a given graph
(Touretzky, 1986; Touretzky et al., 1987; Boutilier, 1989).
In what follows we sometimes describe sets of sentences in terms
of structural properties of those sets when represented in graphic
notation; in these terms, theories are directed acyclic graphs.
Touretzky et al. (1987) outline a space of proof-theoretic
variations in inheritance reasoners. According to the axes
of variation that they identify, the reasoner of Horty et al.
(1990) is restrictedly skeptical, off-path preempting, and up-
wards chaining. Hewson and Vogel (1994) investigate the
degree to which human reasoning with sets of abstract gene-
rics corresponds to the predictions made by these properties.
In this paper, we examine more foundational proof-theoretic
assumptions assumed by a wider class of reasoners and not
identified as a point of conflict among reasoners by Touretzky
et al. (1987) nor investigated by (Elio & Pelletier, 1993);
these properties are: transitivity, negativity, preemption, and
redundancy.
Transitivity. This property is realized in inheritance rea-
soners that admit chaining of explicit links into paths corre-
sponding to implicit conclusions. Chains of statements can be
either positive or negative, and can have arbitrary (but finite)
length. Not all inheritance systems admit general chaining,
notably the statistically based ones (Bacchus, 1989), because
it is not a statistically valid inference for defaults, although
it is a practically tenable inference. Thus, it is interesting
to test both whether people draw conclusions consistent with
transitivity at all and whether there is an interesting limit on
the maximum length.
Negativity. The literature defines a negative path as one in
which the final link is a negative link and the preceding links
(if any) are all positive. This reflects the intuition that one
cannot reason beyond a negative assertion of the form As are
normally not Bs: if As are normally not Bs, then As stand in
no transitive relation to anything else that Bs might be. No-
netheless, general sequences that include non-final negative
links can be labeled negative chains. It is possible that people
reason with such statements as if negativity is a feature, so
that if As are normally not Bs and Bs are normally Cs, then
As would be considered normally not Cs. Also possible in
this light is that ‘double negations’ can cancel or intensify
each other. Both potential responses are classically invalid,
but negativity propagation is more pragmatically misguided
than chaining: no inheritance reasoner builds in these fea-
tures. Hence, it is interesting to test the distinction between
negative paths and negative chains.
Preemption. Preemptive links are treated uniformly in the
literature as providing specific information that should over-
ride longer paths whose endpoints they connect. For example,
DA B C
, represents a network in which the inheritance
literature nearly unanimously agrees to license the conclusion
that As are not Ds. A test of the plausibility of preemption is
simultaneously a test of instances of applicability of shortest
path reasoning.
Redundancy. The priority of explicit links has been iden-
tified as a controversial issue with respect to stable reasoning
(Boutilier, 1989). But, since Touretzky’s thesis (Touretzky,
1986) it has been accepted in the literature that certain topolo-
gically identifiable links in inheritance networks are redundant
since they convey no information that is not already present
in longer paths, through transitivity. Essentially, certain ex-
plicit links are deemed redundant with respect to implicit
It is important to remember the difference between this and the
weaker: As are not normally Bs.
links, in particular, when the explicit link expresses the same
conclusion that can be drawn from a longer path. In terms
of graph topology, a ‘redundant’ link is a direct link that
connects the endpoints of another path with the same polarity.
For instance, a reasoner that implements transitive inference
would likely conclude from this network, A B C , that As
are normally Cs. Thus, this related network,
A B C
, is
deemed to contain no additional information. In a reasoner
that incorporates transitivity, the conclusions implicit in both
graphs are the same regardless of the information-supplying
status of the redundant link; however, when graphs like these
are embedded in larger networks such as, DA B C ,
and
DA B C
, a reasoner that assumes redundancy (as
nearly all path-based reasoners do) will reach the same con-
clusions for both graphs, but reasoners that assume each direct
linkconveys novel information may sanction different conclu-
sions for each graph.
Experiment
Seventy-two subjects were presented with 40 problems that
were designed to elicit responses which would determine
whether people reason in accord with particular inheritance
reasoners.
Materials. Each problem presented a set of default state-
ments about abstract classes, followed by a question in multi-
ple choice format; the question asked what conclusions could
be drawn, based on the stated information, about the relati-
onship between two of the classes represented (see Fig.2).
The problems were presented either in graphical form, in
sentential form, or with both graphical and sentential forms
together; this created one between subjects factor—mode of
presentation—which had three levels (graph, sentence, and
graph+sentence). Within the inheritance literature the kind of
information represented in such problems tends to be presen-
ted graphically; the purpose of constructing a factor ‘mode
of presentation’ was to determine whether the responses eli-
cited by subjects would be affected by this factor. This has
important methodological implications for investigating the
psychological plausibility of inheritance reasoners. Fig. 2
shows the graph+sentence version of problem No. 1.
Subjects. 52 Canadian students between 7th and 12th
grade participated as a result of a call for subjects posted to
SchoolNet, an electronic network of Canadian schools; 20
post-secondary school individuals from North America and
Europe participated by responding individually to a call for
subjects sent to an assortment of internet newsgroups.
Design and Procedure. Each subject was presented with a
questionnaire containing all 40 problems, randomly ordered;
two random presentations (one random order and its reverse)
were used and subjects were randomly assigned to receive
either of these. The questionnaire contained full instructions
to subjects on how to answer the problems; it was stressed
that there were no right or wrong answers, and subjects were
to say what they thought could be concluded from the infor-
mation given. The factor mode of presentation created three
experimental conditions: in one condition subjects received
each problem in graph format, in a second condition subjects
received each problem in sentence format, and in a third con-
dition subjects received each problem in both sentence and
1A B C
  As are normally Bs.
  Bs are normally Cs.
What can you conclude from these statements? Asterisk (*) the
appropriate answer.
(a) As are normally Cs.
(b) As are normally not Cs.
(c) As are normally Cs and normally not Cs.
(d) It isn’t definite whether As are normally Cs or normally not
Cs.
(e) I don’t know.
If you wish, explain why you reach this conclusion.
Figure 2: An Example Question
graph formats together.
The materials were distributed electronically. As the Ca-
nadian secondary school students did not have facilities for
previewing graphics, they were assigned to the sentence only
condition. Text files containing the questionnaire in both or-
derings were emailed to the relevant teachers who randomly
assigned them to students and organized their return. The
graph only and mixed modes of presentation were offered to
people with access to internet news, upon individual request.
For each of these conditions, files containing the same orde-
rings of the problems as in the sentence only condition and
corresponding answersheets were made available via FTP in
a unique location, the answersheets returned to us electroni-
cally upon completion. 10 subjects received the graph only
condition and 10 received the mixed modes of presentation.
No limit was imposed on the time subjects spent on each
problem.
Results and Discussion
The results were analyzed by picking out sets of problems that
enabled conclusions to be drawn regarding the conformance
of subjects’ responses to specific predictions of inheritance
reasoners. By this method it was possible to examine the
extent to which people reasoned in accord with particular
isolable features of these models.
Responses were coded in terms of the multiple choice an-
swer categories (a–e, as shown in Fig.2), thus making it pos-
sible to directly compare subjects’ responses with the predic-
tions of inheritance reasoners. Option ‘c’ classifies an asser-
tion of definite inconsistency represented by a set of generic
statements, but option ‘d’ expresses indeterminacy. This di-
stinction is important to the inheritance literature since most
inheritance logics classify the statements in Fig. 3.a as in-
consistent, but the ones represented by Fig. 3.b and Fig. 3.c
are deemed inconclusive. However, both answers ‘c’ and ‘d’
So that no participant had access to other possible conditions in
which to participate accidentally.
can be grouped together to form a general response category
meaning “not ‘a’ or ‘b’,” since the alternative option ‘e’, “I
don’t know,” was also provided and exercised. In analysis of
the data, categories ‘c’ and ‘d’ were collapsed into a single
response category, and the category ‘e’ (I don’t know) was
excluded; thus the three response categories used were ‘a’,
‘b’, and ‘c/d’. We refer to subjects’ responses as the predicted
answer (the answer to a problem as predicted by H90 when it
is ‘a’ or ‘b’), the complement answer (when it is ‘a’ or ‘b’), or
an indeterminate answer (when it is ‘c or d’).
A B
a. Inconsistency
A B C
D
b. Ambiguity
A B C D
c. Vacuity
Figure 3: Category ‘c/d’: Indeterminacy
Transitivity
To test whether people reason in accord with transitivity sub-
jects’ responses to the problems with just one linear path,
or a linear path with a redundant link, were compared with
the responses predicted by the inheritance literature. It was
found that 66% of subjects’ responses conformed to the li-
terature prediction; of the remaining 35% of responses, 11%
fell into the complement category and 23% fell into cate-
gory ‘c/d’. A chi square analysis showed this difference in
the proportion of responses in each category to be significant
(    p  ).
These results indicate that people do tend to reason in ac-
cord with transitivity. This means that people tend to conclude
from the facts that As are normally Bs and Bs are normally
Cs that As are normally Cs. Having said this, there were still
a remaining 35% of responses which did not accord with the
transitive conclusion; this result may reflect the influence of
considered statistical validity—indeed, a number of subjects
indicated this as the motivation for their answers. Inheritance
reasoners generally admit transitivity, althoughas noted above
in the Inheritance Reasoning section, some systems limit the
length of chaining. We found for linear graphs that the ten-
dency to reason transitively fit up to the maximum length we
tested—three links (i.e. subjects’ responses did not vary as a
function of number of links). This finding supports the basic
assumption of inheritance proof theory that some chaining
should be admitted.
Log linear analysis showed that mode of presentation did
affect responses to problems for which the predicted answer
was ‘a’ ( 	  

 p  ), but not those for which
the predicted answer was ‘b’. For the former, the graphical
conditions (graph only and graph+sentence) elicited mainly
predicted responses, no complement responses, and very few
indeterminate responses; however, in the sentence only con-
dition subjects were less likely to give the predicted answer
and more likely to give both the complement and indeter-
minate answers. Note that for each mode of presentation
answers were more likely to conform to the predictions of
transitivity, but the ‘cleaner’ conformance in the graph-only
condition is stark. It suggests that the graphs lend interpre-
tive strategies in addition to simply denoting the equivalent
generics. This suggests that the natural semantics of graphs
interacts with reasoning about problems when they are ex-
pressed as graphs, but problems with certain structures might
lead to significantly diverging responses. This is an important
point because inheritance proof theory has been developed
largely with topological features of graphs in mind, and for
that reason may have been misled into devices that conflict
with human reasoning with generics. Although there was no
significant effect of mode of presentation on responses to the
problems for which the predicted answer was ‘b’, a similar
trend was observed.
Negative Paths
We distinguish between negative paths as defined above and
negative chains as sequences of links containing one or more
negative links but which are not also negative paths. To test
whether people reason in accordance with this distinction,
responses to those problems with one negative path only were
compared with responses to those with one negative chain
only.
For both chains and paths subjects gave very few ‘a’ re-
sponses; however, whereas for negative paths there were a
lot more ‘b’ (65%) than ‘c/d’ (27%) responses, for negative
chains there were roughly equal numbers of ‘b’ (41%) and
‘c/d’ (47%) responses. Subjects were more likely to say ‘b’
and less likely to say ‘c/d’ for negative paths than for negative
chains (   
 p  ), thus indicating that they
do distinguish between the two. This suggests that people
differentiate the validity of transitivity and general negative
chaining. However, the results present some surprises: alt-
hough people largely reason in accord with predictions for
negative paths, the answers elicited with respect to negative
chains show greater deviation from literature predictions. The
equal proportion of ‘c/d’ (predicted) and ‘b’ answers to ne-
gative chains indicates a substantial tendency for people to
opt for the incorrect answer (where set theoretic interpretati-
ons arbitrate). One speculation, which provides a basis for
follow-up studies, is that less abstract problems would alter
this pattern of responses.
Log linear analysis revealed that mode of presentation had
an effect on subjects’ responses for negative chains ( 	 

 p  ) but not for negative paths. For chains, in
the graph only condition subjects responded ‘c/d’(64%) more
often than ‘b’(33%), but in the sentence only condition there
were equal numbers of responses in these categories (43%).
(The graph/sentence condition had slightly more ‘c/d’(54%)
responses than ‘b’(42%) responses). This result reinforces the
trend observed in the preceding discussion of transitivity for
responses to be more polarized in the graph conditions than
in the sentence condition.
Preemptive Links
As described in the Inheritance Reasoning section, preemptive
links are treated almost uniformly in the literature as providing
more specific information that should override longer paths
whose endpoints they connect. To test whether subjects dealt
with preemptive links as predicted by the literature, 5 pairs of
problems were compared; each comparison involved a graph
and its sister graph which was identical except for the addition
of one preemptive link.
The first comparison involved the graph ( A B C ) and
its sister ( A B C ); the inheritance literature predicts that
subjects should answer ‘b’ to the first of these and ‘a’ to its
sister. Subjects gave mainly the predicted answer (68%) to the
first graph, but there were also a fair number of indeterminate
responses (27%); however, for the sister graph subjects were
as likely to give an indeterminate response (42%) as the pre-
dicted response (43%). Log linear analysis showed that the
difference in distribution of responses to each of these pro-
blems was significant (   

 p  ); thus, with
the addition of the preemptive link there was a reduction of
‘b’ (predicted) responses which was reflected in an increase in
both ‘a’ (predicted) and ‘c/d’ responses (with the increase in
predicted responses being greater). This result suggests that
the effect of a preemptive link is not to override the existing
path, as the inheritance literature argues, but rather to add
extra information which is considered along with the existing
path.
Log linear analysis showed an interaction between the diffe-
rence in subjects’ responses to each of the problems and mode
of presentation ( 	  
 p  ): for the graph only
and graph+sentence conditions there was a very large drop
in the number of ‘b’ responses (from 90% and 78%, both to
0%) between the graph and its sister, accounted for by an
increase in both ‘a’ and ‘c/d’ responses. However, for the
sentence only condition the observed drop in ‘b’ responses
was a lot less (61% to 20%), and was accounted for primarily
by an increase in ‘a’ responses. Again this result confirms the
observation that the distribution of subjects’ responses tends
to be more polarized when graphical rather than sentential
information is presented.
A second comparison involved the two graphs ( A B C )
and ( A B C ). This pair is symmetric to the preceding one,
and elicited an almost identical pattern of results (in terms of
predicted, complement, and indeterminate responses). As
above, log linear analysis showed the observed difference
in the distribution of responses to each of these two graphs
to be significant (   	 p  ). This sustains
the inference that people do not treat a preemptive link as
overridingan existing path in the way the inheritance literature
predicts. Surprisingly, in contrast to the previous case, no
significant effect of mode of presentation was found for this
comparison.
The graphs ( A B C D ) and ( DA B C ) were
involved in the third comparison. Again, log linear analysis
showed that the distribution of subjects’ responses between
each of these graphs was significantly different (  

 p  ), and this effect interacted with mode of pre-
sentation ( 	   p  ). Subjects gave mainly
the predicted answer (60%) to the first graph, though there
were also about half as many indeterminate responses (31%);
for the sister most responses fell into the indeterminate cate-
gory (54%), and roughly half as many in each of the predicted
(24%) and complement (22%) categories. In this case the
addition of the preempting link revealed a decrease in ‘a’
(predicted) responses, accounted for by an increase in both
‘b’ and ‘c/d’ responses; however, the predicted increase in ‘b’
responses was smaller than the unexpected increase in ‘c/d’
responses. Again this result suggests that the effect of a pre-
empting link is not to override the existing information, but
to add to it. As for the effect of mode of presentation, for
both the graph-involving conditions there was a large drop in
the number of ‘a’ responses—in the graph only condition this
drop was accounted for by an increase in ‘c/d’ responses, and
in the graph/sentence condition it was accounted for by an
increase in both ‘c/d’ and ‘b’ responses. In the sentence only
condition the decrease in ‘a’ responses was less marked, and
was accounted for by an increase in ‘c/d’ and ‘b’ responses.
Again the graph conditions show more polarized response.
A fourth comparison examined a pair of graphs which
are symmetric to the above pair, ( A B C D ) and
( DA B C ). The pattern of responses elicited by these
graphs was very similar to the pattern described above (in
terms of predicted, complement, and indeterminate respon-
ses), and again the observed difference in the distribution of
responses to each of these graphs was significant under a log
linear analysis (   
 p  ). This reinforces the
same conclusion. However, unexpectedly, the effect of mode
of presentation in this case was not significant though it did
approach significance  	   p  	.
A final analysis compared graphs (
A B C
D ) and
(
A B C
D ); the distributionsof responses between these two
graph were significantly different (    p  ).
To the first graph subjects responded mainly ‘c/d’ (65%) as
predicted, and to a lesser extent, and each about equally,
‘a’(15%) and ‘b’ (19%)); to its sister they responded mostly
‘b’ (53%) as predicted, but also ‘c/d’ (37%) and ‘a’ (10%).
Thus, addition of a preemptive link in this case is reflected
in a decrease in ‘c/d’ responses, accounted for by an increase
in ‘b’ responses. Since this shift from ‘c/d’ to ‘b’ responses
was only partial, where the literature predicts a complete shift
from ‘c/d’ to ‘b’, this result also confirms the idea that addition
of a preemptive link does not override the existing link. There
was no effect on mode of presentation on this result. This test
provides a specific point of comparison with the results of the
pilot experiment run by Elio and Pelletier (1993); we found
for the first of the two graphs that people mainly classified the
graph as indeterminate (65%) and only 15% and 19% in each
of the definite categories while in Elio and Pelletier’s (1993)
study of the same problem (presented with interpretations and
with a different sort of question) roughly half of the people
found the problem determinate, though people still split about
equally between the two determinate categories.
Redundant Links
The effect of redundant links on subjects’ responses was ex-
amined by comparing the responses to pairs of graphs that
were identical apart from one redundant link; if subjects rea-
son in accord with the predictions of the literature then their
answers should not be affected by the addition of a redundant
link. These paired comparisons could be broken into two
groups based on the balance of polarity among paths through
the networks—those in which the original graph had an equal
number of positive or negative paths and for which the additio-
nal link would have offset the balance and those in which the
original graph had only paths of one polarity or the other and
the additional link created just another path of the same pola-
rity. As expected in the latter case, it was found, for each of
the paired comparisons, that subjects’ responses were not sig-
nificantly affected by the addition of a redundant link, nor was
there an interaction of mode of presentation. The former case
is more interesting to the inheritance literature since it invol-
ves comparisons between graphs like ( DA B C ) and
( DA B C ), and if the inheritance literature is correct
there will be no difference in response because the additional
link contains no information that is not already in the original
graph. An alternative proof theory in which explicit links are
assumed to convey novel informationmight propose a method
of ‘path counting’ in which the number of arguments in favor
of one conclusion or the other determines the decision and
would predict a different response between the two problems.
As it happens, there was not a significant difference in res-
ponse, which in this case fails to support path counting. Ho-
wever, it cannot really be taken as evidence for the predictions
of the inheritance literature because the inheritance literature
predicted no change in answers between the two graphs, but
further predicted a definite rather than indeterminate response
to the graphs. The response patterns for the first graph were
stated in the preceding section where it was pointed out that
people behaved contrary to the predictions of the inheritance
literature: 24% gave the response predicted by the literature
(‘b’) and 22% gave the complementary response, while 54%
classified it as indeterminate although the literature presents
strong intuitions that people will conclude that As are nor-
mally Ds. People gave similar responses to the sister graph
with the redundant link (62% indeterminate, 17% predicted
and 21% complementary). Log linear analysis showed there
to be no significant difference between the distributions of
responses to each of these graphs. This supports the intuition
presented in the inheritance literature that the additional link
is in fact redundant, even though the predicted response to
the graph is not borne out. To understand this, note that a
‘path counting’ system which incorporated a topological de-
finition of redundancy would have predicted that both graphs
be classified as indeterminate since they would have an equal
number of non-redundant positive and negative paths.
Another comparison examined the pair, ( DA B C )
and its sister ( DA B C ) which are symmetric in pola-
rity to the first comparison. As in that case, people answered
contrary to the inheritance literature for the first graph: 66%
indeterminate, 15% predicted (‘a’) and 19% complement. For
the sister graph responses were: 53% indeterminate, 11% pre-
dicted, and 36% complement. Again there was no significant
difference between the distributions of responses to each of
these graphs. It is interesting that, though not significant, there
was an observed trend in the responses to these two graphs
such that with the addition of the redundant link responses
shifted away from determinacy, not to the literature-predicted
answer (‘a’), but to the answer that would have been predic-
ted by a path counting method (‘b’). However, the nonsi-
gnificance of the difference gives support to the idea that the
additional link does not convey novel information.
General Discussion
This study finds human reasoning consistent with the inheri-
tance literature in terms of its basic assumption of transitive
reasoning with defaults, but found that people do not satisfy
the literature’s predictions about negative chains. More funda-
mentally, we found a tendency for people to take ‘preemptive’
links as additional information leading to indeterminacy rather
than preemption as predicted by the literature. On the other
hand, we did find support for the idea that links which express
the same information that is contained in longer paths do not
change responses to problems when added to graphs and are
effectively ‘redundant,’ as the literature predicts. Graphic pre-
sentation of the problems polarized responses to problems in
a way that suggests that the syntax of inheritance reasoners
has influenced its proof-theory beyond its initial motivations
for capturing human reasoning with generics.
We have presented an experiment which provides data about
human reasoning with generics and the degree to which human
reasoning makes inheritance reasoning a plausible formal mo-
del. We focused on foundational assumptions of inheritance
reasoning and tested them using abstract concepts and generic
relations among them. Follow-up studies should investigate
the interaction of less abstract interpretations. The present
results factor out the difficult to control influence of personal
knowledge and beliefs about real classifications like ‘pacifist’
or ‘birds’. The inheritance literature would model the effect
that specific background knowledge has on the conclusions
derived from a set of generics involving concrete interpreta-
tions by encoding those beliefs as direct links and invoking
preemption. Transitivity may accurately describe people’s
behavior in certain abstract cases as well as for interpreted
instances in which inference is performed rather than direct
recall: without further contextual information, people should
reason transitivelywith the information represented in Fig. 4.a
to conclude that penguins are fliers. The influence of world
knowledge which might prevent this inference is modeled by
inheritance reasoners with preemption by an explicit link, as
represented in Fig. 4.b. However, we found little support for
preemption in ungrounded reasoning.
a.
Penguins Birds Fliers
b.
Penguins Birds Fliers
Figure 4: Representing Context
The nature of the conflicting intuitions on inheritance proof
theory is such that it is informed more by studies that discrimi-
nate the influence of the abstract structure of a set of sentences
than by the determination of which facts are explicitly repre-
sented and which are implicit. However, a more interesting
set of contextual effects given the model of reasoning supplied
by the inheritance literature would be those factors that have
an impact on the abstract patterns of reasoning rather than
the presence or absence of explicit information—for instance
whether reasoning with known quantities (as opposed to using
sets that have fuzzy cardinality, like ‘chairs’) eliminates the
applicability of transitive reasoning. Studies of both abstract
and grounded reasoning are importantparts of the general pro-
blem of determining whether there is abstract systematicity in
human reasoning with generic information.
Further studies should explore more of the proof-theoretic
claims in greater detail. Hewson and Vogel (1994) consider
on-path and off-path preemption as well as cascaded ambi-
guity (cf. Touretzky et al., 1987) in addition to the more
foundational consideration of symmetry between positive and
negative conclusions. The initial result presented here on re-
dundancy should also be examined further, especially given
the conflicting intuitions in the literature about what the ap-
propriate topological definition of redundancy should be (cf.
Boutilier, 1989). For example, Horty et al. (1990) use a more
complex definition than the one we suggested using informal
terms in this paper; in theirs certain links that are redundant in
the simpler terms are in fact deemed by them to convey novel
information. We have not tested these problems. Finally, the
present analysis suggests that path-counting should also be
studied in closer detail to determine its efficacy as a predictor
of human reasoning with generics as a model of weighted
evidence.
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